sudo, sudoedit - execute a command as another
user
sudo
-h | -K | -k | -V
sudo -v [-ABkNnS]
[-g group] [-h host]
[-p prompt] [-u user]
sudo -l [-ABkNnS]
[-g group] [-h host]
[-p prompt] [-U user]
[-u user]
[command [arg ...]]
sudo [-ABbEHnPS] [-C num]
[-D directory] [-g group]
[-h host] [-p prompt]
[-R directory] [-T timeout]
[-u user] [VAR=value]
[-i | -s]
[command [arg ...]]
sudoedit [-ABkNnS] [-C num]
[-D directory] [-g group]
[-h host] [-p prompt]
[-R directory] [-T timeout]
[-u user] file ...
sudo allows a permitted user to execute a command as
the superuser or another user, as specified by the security policy. The
invoking user's real (not effective) user-ID is used to determine the
user name with which to query the security policy.
sudo supports a plugin architecture for security policies,
auditing, and input/output logging. Third parties can develop and distribute
their own plugins to work seamlessly with the sudo front-end. The
default security policy is sudoers, which is configured via the file
/private/etc/sudoers, or via LDAP. See the Plugins section for
more information.
The security policy determines what privileges, if any, a user has
to run sudo. The policy may require that users authenticate
themselves with a password or another authentication mechanism. If
authentication is required, sudo will exit if the user's password is
not entered within a configurable time limit. This limit is policy-specific;
the default password prompt timeout for the sudoers security policy
is 0 minutes.
Security policies may support credential caching to allow the user
to run sudo again for a period of time without requiring
authentication. By default, the sudoers policy caches credentials on
a per-terminal basis for 5 minutes. See the timestamp_type and
timestamp_timeout options in sudoers(5) for more information. By
running sudo with the -v option, a user can update the cached
credentials without running a command.
On systems where sudo is the primary method of gaining
superuser privileges, it is imperative to avoid syntax errors in the
security policy configuration files. For the default security policy,
sudoers(5), changes to the configuration files should be made using the
visudo(8) utility which will ensure that no syntax errors are
introduced.
When invoked as sudoedit, the -e option (described
below), is implied.
Security policies and audit plugins may log successful and failed
attempts to run sudo. If an I/O plugin is configured, the running
command's input and output may be logged as well.
The options are as follows:
- -A, --askpass
- Normally, if sudo requires a password, it will read it from the
user's terminal. If the -A (askpass) option is specified, a
(possibly graphical) helper program is executed to read the user's
password and output the password to the standard output. If the
SUDO_ASKPASS environment variable is set, it specifies the path to the
helper program. Otherwise, if sudo.conf(5) contains a line specifying the
askpass program, that value will be used. For example:
# Path to askpass helper program
Path askpass /usr/X11R6/bin/ssh-askpass
If no askpass program is available, sudo will exit with an
error.
- -a type,
--auth-type=type
- Use the specified BSD authentication type when validating the user,
if allowed by /etc/login.conf. The system administrator may specify
a list of sudo-specific authentication methods by adding an
“auth-sudo” entry in /etc/login.conf. This option is
only available on systems that support BSD authentication.
- -B, --bell
- Ring the bell as part of the password prompt when a terminal is present.
This option has no effect if an askpass program is used.
- -b,
--background
- Run the given command in the background. It is not possible to use
shell job control to manipulate background processes started by
sudo. Most interactive commands will fail to work properly
in background mode.
- -C num,
--close-from=num
- Close all file descriptors greater than or equal to num before
executing a command. Values less than three are not permitted. By
default, sudo will close all open file descriptors other than
standard input, standard output, and standard error when executing a
command. The security policy may restrict the user's ability to use
this option. The sudoers policy only permits use of the -C
option when the administrator has enabled the closefrom_override
option.
- -c class,
--login-class=class
- Run the command with resource limits and scheduling priority of the
specified login class. The class argument can be either a
class name as defined in /etc/login.conf, or a single
‘-’ character. If class is -, the default
login class of the target user will be used. Otherwise, the command
must be run as the superuser (user-ID 0), or sudo must be run from
a shell that is already running as the superuser. If the command is
being run as a login shell, additional /etc/login.conf settings,
such as the umask and environment variables, will be applied, if present.
This option is only available on systems with BSD login classes.
- -D directory,
--chdir=directory
- Run the command in the specified directory instead of the
current working directory. The security policy may return an error if the
user does not have permission to specify the working directory.
- -E,
--preserve-env
- Indicates to the security policy that the user wishes to preserve their
existing environment variables. The security policy may return an error if
the user does not have permission to preserve the environment.
- --preserve-env=list
- Indicates to the security policy that the user wishes to add the
comma-separated list of environment variables to those preserved from the
user's environment. The security policy may return an error if the user
does not have permission to preserve the environment. This option may be
specified multiple times.
- -e, --edit
- Edit one or more files instead of running a command. In lieu
of a path name, the string "sudoedit" is used when consulting
the security policy. If the user is authorized by the policy, the
following steps are taken:
- 1.
- Temporary copies are made of the files to be edited with the owner set to
the invoking user.
- 2.
- The editor specified by the policy is run to edit the temporary files. The
sudoers policy uses the SUDO_EDITOR, VISUAL and EDITOR environment
variables (in that order). If none of SUDO_EDITOR, VISUAL or EDITOR are
set, the first program listed in the editor sudoers(5) option is
used.
- 3.
- If they have been modified, the temporary files are copied back to their
original location and the temporary versions are removed.
To help prevent the editing of unauthorized files, the following
restrictions are enforced unless explicitly allowed by the security
policy:
- •
- Symbolic links may not be edited (version 1.8.15 and higher).
- •
- Symbolic links along the path to be edited are not followed when the
parent directory is writable by the invoking user unless that user is root
(version 1.8.16 and higher).
- •
- Files located in a directory that is writable by the invoking user may not
be edited unless that user is root (version 1.8.16 and higher).
Users are never allowed to edit device special files.
If the specified file does not exist, it will be created. Unlike
most commands run by sudo, the editor is run with the invoking
user's environment unmodified. If the temporary file becomes empty after
editing, the user will be prompted before it is installed. If, for some
reason, sudo is unable to update a file with its edited version, the
user will receive a warning and the edited copy will remain in a temporary
file.
- -g group,
--group=group
- Run the command with the primary group set to group instead
of the primary group specified by the target user's password database
entry. The group may be either a group name or a numeric group-ID
(GID) prefixed with the ‘#’ character (e.g.,
‘#0’ for GID 0). When running a command as a GID,
many shells require that the ‘#’ be escaped with a backslash
(‘\’). If no -u option is specified, the
command will be run as the invoking user. In either case, the
primary group will be set to group. The sudoers policy
permits any of the target user's groups to be specified via the -g
option as long as the -P option is not in use.
- -H,
--set-home
- Request that the security policy set the HOME environment variable to the
home directory specified by the target user's password database entry.
Depending on the policy, this may be the default behavior.
- -h, --help
- Display a short help message to the standard output and exit.
- -h host,
--host=host
- Run the command on the specified host if the security policy
plugin supports remote commands. The sudoers plugin does not
currently support running remote commands. This may also be used in
conjunction with the -l option to list a user's privileges for the
remote host.
- -i, --login
- Run the shell specified by the target user's password database entry as a
login shell. This means that login-specific resource files such as
.profile, .bash_profile, or .login will be read by
the shell. If a command is specified, it is passed to the shell as
a simple command using the -c option. The command and
any args are concatenated, separated by spaces, after escaping each
character (including white space) with a backslash (‘\’)
except for alphanumerics, underscores, hyphens, and dollar signs. If no
command is specified, an interactive shell is executed. sudo
attempts to change to that user's home directory before running the shell.
The command is run with an environment similar to the one a user
would receive at log in. Most shells behave differently when a
command is specified as compared to an interactive session; consult
the shell's manual for details. The Command environment section in
the sudoers(5) manual documents how the -i option affects the
environment in which a command is run when the sudoers
policy is in use.
- -K,
--remove-timestamp
- Similar to the -k option, except that it removes every cached
credential for the user, regardless of the terminal or parent process ID.
The next time sudo is run, a password must be entered if the
security policy requires authentication. It is not possible to use the
-K option in conjunction with a command or other option.
This option does not require a password. Not all security policies support
credential caching.
- -k,
--reset-timestamp
- When used without a command, invalidates the user's cached
credentials for the current session. The next time sudo is run in
the session, a password must be entered if the security policy requires
authentication. By default, the sudoers policy uses a separate
record in the credential cache for each terminal (or parent process ID if
no terminal is present). This prevents the -k option from
interfering with sudo commands run in a different terminal session.
See the timestamp_type option in sudoers(5) for more information.
This option does not require a password, and was added to allow a user to
revoke sudo permissions from a .logout file.
When used in conjunction with a command or an option
that may require a password, this option will cause sudo to
ignore the user's cached credentials. As a result, sudo will
prompt for a password (if one is required by the security policy) and
will not update the user's cached credentials.
Not all security policies support credential caching.
- -l, --list
- If no command is specified, list the privileges for the invoking
user (or the user specified by the -U option) on the current
host. A longer list format is used if this option is specified multiple
times and the security policy supports a verbose output format.
If a command is specified and is permitted by the
security policy, the fully-qualified path to the command is
displayed along with any args. If a command is specified
but not allowed by the policy, sudo will exit with a status value
of 1.
- -N,
--no-update
- Do not update the user's cached credentials, even if the user successfully
authenticates. Unlike the -k flag, existing cached credentials are
used if they are valid. To detect when the user's cached credentials are
valid (or when no authentication is required), the following can be
used:
sudo -Nnv
Not all security policies support credential caching.
- -n,
--non-interactive
- Avoid prompting the user for input of any kind. If a password is required
for the command to run, sudo will display an error message
and exit.
- -P,
--preserve-groups
- Preserve the invoking user's group vector unaltered. By default, the
sudoers policy will initialize the group vector to the list of
groups the target user is a member of. The real and effective group-IDs,
however, are still set to match the target user.
- -p prompt,
--prompt=prompt
- Use a custom password prompt with optional escape sequences. The following
percent (‘%’) escape sequences are supported by the
sudoers policy:
- %H
- expanded to the host name including the domain name (only if the machine's
host name is fully qualified or the fqdn option is set in
sudoers(5))
- %h
- expanded to the local host name without the domain name
- %p
- expanded to the name of the user whose password is being requested
(respects the rootpw, targetpw, and runaspw flags in
sudoers(5))
- %U
- expanded to the login name of the user the command will be run as
(defaults to root unless the -u option is also specified)
- %u
- expanded to the invoking user's login name
- %%
- two consecutive ‘%’ characters are collapsed into a single
‘%’ character
The custom prompt will override the default prompt specified by
either the security policy or the SUDO_PROMPT environment variable. On
systems that use PAM, the custom prompt will also override the prompt
specified by a PAM module unless the passprompt_override flag is
disabled in sudoers.
- -R directory,
--chroot=directory
- Change to the specified root directory (see chroot(8)) before
running the command. The security policy may return an error if the
user does not have permission to specify the root directory.
- -r role,
--role=role
- Run the command with an SELinux security context that includes the
specified role.
- -S, --stdin
- Write the prompt to the standard error and read the password from the
standard input instead of using the terminal device.
- -s, --shell
- Run the shell specified by the SHELL environment variable if it is set or
the shell specified by the invoking user's password database entry. If a
command is specified, it is passed to the shell as a simple command
using the -c option. The command and any args are
concatenated, separated by spaces, after escaping each character
(including white space) with a backslash (‘\’) except for
alphanumerics, underscores, hyphens, and dollar signs. If no
command is specified, an interactive shell is executed. Most shells
behave differently when a command is specified as compared to an
interactive session; consult the shell's manual for details.
- -t type,
--type=type
- Run the command with an SELinux security context that includes the
specified type. If no type is specified, the default type is
derived from the role.
- -U user,
--other-user=user
- Used in conjunction with the -l option to list the privileges for
user instead of for the invoking user. The security policy may
restrict listing other users' privileges. When using the sudoers
policy, the -U option is restricted to the root user and users with
either the “list” priviege for the specified user or
the ability to run any command as root or user on the
current host.
- -T timeout,
--command-timeout=timeout
- Used to set a timeout for the command. If the timeout expires
before the command has exited, the command will be
terminated. The security policy may restrict the user's ability to set
timeouts. The sudoers policy requires that user-specified timeouts
be explicitly enabled.
- -u user,
--user=user
- Run the command as a user other than the default target user
(usually root). The user may be either a user name or a
numeric user-ID (UID) prefixed with the ‘#’ character (e.g.,
‘#0’ for UID 0). When running commands as a UID, many
shells require that the ‘#’ be escaped with a backslash
(‘\’). Some security policies may restrict UIDs to those
listed in the password database. The sudoers policy allows UIDs
that are not in the password database as long as the targetpw
option is not set. Other security policies may not support this.
- -V, --version
- Print the sudo version string as well as the version string of any
configured plugins. If the invoking user is already root, the -V
option will display the options passed to configure when sudo was
built; plugins may display additional information such as default
options.
- -v,
--validate
- Update the user's cached credentials, authenticating the user if
necessary. For the sudoers plugin, this extends the sudo
timeout for another 5 minutes by default, but does not run a
command. Not all security policies support cached credentials.
- --
- The -- is used to delimit the end of the sudo options.
Subsequent options are passed to the command.
Options that take a value may only be specified once unless
otherwise indicated in the description. This is to help guard against
problems caused by poorly written scripts that invoke sudo with
user-controlled input.
Environment variables to be set for the command may also be
passed as options to sudo in the form VAR=value, for
example LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/usr/local/pkg/lib. Environment variables may
be subject to restrictions imposed by the security policy plugin. The
sudoers policy subjects environment variables passed as options to
the same restrictions as existing environment variables with one important
difference. If the setenv option is set in sudoers, the
command to be run has the SETENV tag set or the command
matched is ALL, the user may set variables that would otherwise be
forbidden. See sudoers(5) for more information.
When sudo executes a command, the security policy
specifies the execution environment for the command. Typically, the
real and effective user and group and IDs are set to match those of the
target user, as specified in the password database, and the group vector is
initialized based on the group database (unless the -P option was
specified).
The following parameters may be specified by security policy:
- •
- real and effective user-ID
- •
- real and effective group-ID
- •
- supplementary group-IDs
- •
- the environment list
- •
- current working directory
- •
- file creation mode mask (umask)
- •
- scheduling priority (aka nice value)
There are two distinct ways sudo can run a
command.
If an I/O logging plugin is configured to log terminal I/O, or if
the security policy explicitly requests it, a new pseudo-terminal
(“pty”) is allocated and fork(2) is used to create a second
sudo process, referred to as the monitor. The monitor
creates a new terminal session with itself as the leader and the pty as its
controlling terminal, calls fork(2) again, sets up the execution environment
as described above, and then uses the execve(2) system call to run the
command in the child process. The monitor exists to relay job
control signals between the user's terminal and the pty the command
is being run in. This makes it possible to suspend and resume the
command normally. Without the monitor, the command
would be in what POSIX terms an “orphaned process group” and
it would not receive any job control signals from the kernel. When the
command exits or is terminated by a signal, the monitor passes
the command's exit status to the main sudo process and exits.
After receiving the command's exit status, the main sudo
process passes the command's exit status to the security policy's
close function, as well as the close function of any configured audit
plugin, and exits.
If no pty is used, sudo calls fork(2), sets up the
execution environment as described above, and uses the execve(2) system call
to run the command in the child process. The main sudo process
waits until the command has completed, then passes the
command's exit status to the security policy's close function, as
well as the close function of any configured audit plugins, and exits. As a
special case, if the policy plugin does not define a close function,
sudo will execute the command directly instead of calling
fork(2) first. The sudoers policy plugin will only define a close
function when I/O logging is enabled, a pty is required, an SELinux role is
specified, the command has an associated timeout, or the
pam_session or pam_setcred options are enabled. Both
pam_session and pam_setcred are enabled by default on systems
using PAM.
On systems that use PAM, the security policy's close function is
responsible for closing the PAM session. It may also log the
command's exit status.
When the command is run as a child of the sudo
process, sudo will relay signals it receives to the command.
The SIGINT and SIGQUIT signals are only relayed when the command is
being run in a new pty or when the signal was sent by a user process, not
the kernel. This prevents the command from receiving SIGINT twice
each time the user enters control-C. Some signals, such as SIGSTOP and
SIGKILL, cannot be caught and thus will not be relayed to the
command. As a general rule, SIGTSTP should be used instead of SIGSTOP
when you wish to suspend a command being run by sudo.
As a special case, sudo will not relay signals that were
sent by the command it is running. This prevents the command
from accidentally killing itself. On some systems, the reboot(8) utility
sends SIGTERM to all non-system processes other than itself before rebooting
the system. This prevents sudo from relaying the SIGTERM signal it
received back to reboot(8), which might then exit before the system was
actually rebooted, leaving it in a half-dead state similar to single user
mode. Note, however, that this check only applies to the command run
by sudo and not any other processes that the command may
create. As a result, running a script that calls reboot(8) or shutdown(8)
via sudo may cause the system to end up in this undefined state
unless the reboot(8) or shutdown(8) are run using the exec() family
of functions instead of system() (which interposes a shell between
the command and the calling process).
Plugins may be specified via Plugin directives in the
sudo.conf(5) file. They may be loaded as dynamic shared objects (on systems
that support them), or compiled directly into the sudo binary. If no
sudo.conf(5) file is present, or if it doesn't contain any Plugin
lines, sudo will use sudoers(5) for the policy, auditing, and I/O
logging plugins. See the sudo.conf(5) manual for details of the
/private/etc/sudo.conf file and the sudo_plugin(5) manual for more
information about the sudo plugin architecture.
Upon successful execution of a command, the exit status
from sudo will be the exit status of the program that was executed.
If the command terminated due to receipt of a signal, sudo
will send itself the same signal that terminated the command.
If the -l option was specified without a command,
sudo will exit with a value of 0 if the user is allowed to run
sudo and they authenticated successfully (as required by the security
policy). If a command is specified with the -l option, the
exit value will only be 0 if the command is permitted by the security
policy, otherwise it will be 1.
If there is an authentication failure, a configuration/permission
problem, or if the given command cannot be executed, sudo
exits with a value of 1. In the latter case, the error string is printed to
the standard error. If sudo cannot stat(2) one or more entries in the
user's PATH, an error is printed to the standard error. (If the directory
does not exist or if it is not really a directory, the entry is ignored and
no error is printed.) This should not happen under normal circumstances. The
most common reason for stat(2) to return “permission denied”
is if you are running an automounter and one of the directories in your PATH
is on a machine that is currently unreachable.
sudo tries to be safe when executing external
commands.
To prevent command spoofing, sudo checks "." and
"" (both denoting current directory) last when searching for a
command in the user's PATH (if one or both are in the PATH).
Depending on the security policy, the user's PATH environment variable may
be modified, replaced, or passed unchanged to the program that sudo
executes.
Users should never be granted sudo privileges to
execute files that are writable by the user or that reside in a directory
that is writable by the user. If the user can modify or replace the
command there is no way to limit what additional commands they
can run.
By default, sudo will only log the command it
explicitly runs. If a user runs a command such as ‘sudo
su’ or ‘sudo sh’, subsequent commands run from
that shell are not subject to sudo's security policy. The same is
true for commands that offer shell escapes (including most editors).
If I/O logging is enabled, subsequent commands will have their input
and/or output logged, but there will not be traditional logs for those
commands. Because of this, care must be taken when giving users
access to commands via sudo to verify that the command
does not inadvertently give the user an effective root shell. For
information on ways to address this, see the Preventing shell escapes
section in sudoers(5).
To prevent the disclosure of potentially sensitive information,
sudo disables core dumps by default while it is executing (they are
re-enabled for the command that is run). This historical practice
dates from a time when most operating systems allowed set-user-ID processes
to dump core by default. To aid in debugging sudo crashes, you may
wish to re-enable core dumps by setting “disable_coredump” to
false in the sudo.conf(5) file as follows:
Set disable_coredump false
See the sudo.conf(5) manual for more information.
sudo utilizes the following environment variables. The
security policy has control over the actual content of the command's
environment.
- EDITOR
- Default editor to use in -e (sudoedit) mode if neither SUDO_EDITOR
nor VISUAL is set.
- MAIL
- Set to the mail spool of the target user when the -i option is
specified, or when env_reset is enabled in sudoers (unless
MAIL is present in the env_keep list).
- HOME
- Set to the home directory of the target user when the -i or
-H options are specified, when the -s option is specified
and set_home is set in sudoers, when always_set_home
is enabled in sudoers, or when env_reset is enabled in
sudoers and HOME is not present in the env_keep list.
- LOGNAME
- Set to the login name of the target user when the -i option is
specified, when the set_logname option is enabled in
sudoers, or when the env_reset option is enabled in
sudoers (unless LOGNAME is present in the env_keep
list).
- PATH
- May be overridden by the security policy.
- SHELL
- Used to determine shell to run with -s option.
- SUDO_ASKPASS
- Specifies the path to a helper program used to read the password if no
terminal is available or if the -A option is specified.
- SUDO_COMMAND
- Set to the command run by sudo, including any args. The
args are truncated at 4096 characters to prevent a potential
execution error.
- SUDO_EDITOR
- Default editor to use in -e (sudoedit) mode.
- SUDO_GID
- Set to the group-ID of the user who invoked sudo.
- SUDO_PROMPT
- Used as the default password prompt unless the -p option was
specified.
- SUDO_PS1
- If set, PS1 will be set to its value for the program being run.
- SUDO_UID
- Set to the user-ID of the user who invoked sudo.
- SUDO_USER
- Set to the login name of the user who invoked sudo.
- USER
- Set to the same value as LOGNAME, described above.
- VISUAL
- Default editor to use in -e (sudoedit) mode if SUDO_EDITOR is not
set.
- /private/etc/sudo.conf
- sudo front-end configuration
The following examples assume a properly configured security
policy.
To get a file listing of an unreadable directory:
$ sudo ls /usr/local/protected
To list the home directory of user yaz on a machine where the file
system holding ~yaz is not exported as root:
To edit the index.html file as user www:
$ sudoedit -u www ~www/htdocs/index.html
To view system logs only accessible to root and users in the adm
group:
$ sudo -g adm more /var/log/syslog
To run an editor as jim with a different primary group:
$ sudoedit -u jim -g audio ~jim/sound.txt
To shut down a machine:
$ sudo shutdown -r +15 "quick reboot"
To make a usage listing of the directories in the /home partition.
The commands are run in a sub-shell to allow the ‘cd’
command and file redirection to work.
$ sudo sh -c "cd /home ; du -s * | sort -rn > USAGE"
Error messages produced by sudo include:
- editing files in a
writable directory is not permitted
- By default, sudoedit does not permit editing a file when any of the
parent directories are writable by the invoking user. This avoids a race
condition that could allow the user to overwrite an arbitrary file. See
the sudoedit_checkdir option in sudoers(5) for more
information.
- editing symbolic
links is not permitted
- By default, sudoedit does not follow symbolic links when opening
files. See the sudoedit_follow option in sudoers(5) for more
information.
- effective uid is not
0, is sudo installed setuid root?
- sudo was not run with root privileges. The sudo binary must
be owned by the root user and have the set-user-ID bit set. Also, it must
not be located on a file system mounted with the ‘nosuid’
option or on an NFS file system that maps uid 0 to an unprivileged
uid.
- effective uid is
not 0, is sudo on a file system with the 'nosuid' option set or an NFS file
system without root privileges?
- sudo was not run with root privileges. The sudo binary has
the proper owner and permissions but it still did not run with root
privileges. The most common reason for this is that the file system the
sudo binary is located on is mounted with the
‘nosuid’ option or it is an NFS file system that maps uid 0
to an unprivileged uid.
- fatal error, unable to load
plugins
- An error occurred while loading or initializing the plugins specified in
sudo.conf(5).
- invalid environment
variable name
- One or more environment variable names specified via the -E option
contained an equal sign (‘=’). The arguments to the
-E option should be environment variable names without an
associated value.
- no password was provided
- When sudo tried to read the password, it did not receive any
characters. This may happen if no terminal is available (or the -S
option is specified) and the standard input has been redirected from
/dev/null.
- a terminal is required to read
the password
- sudo needs to read the password but there is no mechanism available
for it to do so. A terminal is not present to read the password from,
sudo has not been configured to read from the standard input, the
-S option was not used, and no askpass helper has been specified
either via the sudo.conf(5) file or the SUDO_ASKPASS environment
variable.
- no writable temporary
directory found
- sudoedit was unable to find a usable temporary directory in which
to store its intermediate files.
- The “no new
privileges” flag is set, which prevents sudo from running as
root.
- sudo was run by a process that has the Linux “no new
privileges” flag is set. This causes the set-user-ID bit to be
ignored when running an executable, which will prevent sudo from
functioning. The most likely cause for this is running sudo within
a container that sets this flag. Check the documentation to see if it is
possible to configure the container such that the flag is not set.
- sudo must be owned by uid 0
and have the setuid bit set
- sudo was not run with root privileges. The sudo binary does
not have the correct owner or permissions. It must be owned by the root
user and have the set-user-ID bit set.
- sudoedit is not
supported on this platform
- It is only possible to run sudoedit on systems that support setting
the effective user-ID.
- timed out reading
password
- The user did not enter a password before the password timeout (5 minutes
by default) expired.
- you do not exist in the passwd
database
- Your user-ID does not appear in the system passwd database.
- you may not specify
environment variables in edit mode
- It is only possible to specify environment variables when running a
command. When editing a file, the editor is run with the user's
environment unmodified.
su(1), stat(2), login_cap(3), passwd(5), sudo.conf(5),
sudo_plugin(5), sudoers(5), sudoers_timestamp(5), sudoreplay(8),
visudo(8)
See the HISTORY.md file in the sudo distribution
(https://www.sudo.ws/about/history/) for a brief history of sudo.
Many people have worked on sudo over the years; this
version consists of code written primarily by:
Todd C. Miller
See the CONTRIBUTORS.md file in the sudo distribution
(https://www.sudo.ws/about/contributors/) for an exhaustive list of people
who have contributed to sudo.
There is no easy way to prevent a user from gaining a root shell
if that user is allowed to run arbitrary commands via sudo.
Also, many programs (such as editors) allow the user to run commands
via shell escapes, thus avoiding sudo's checks. However, on most
systems it is possible to prevent shell escapes with the sudoers(5) plugin's
noexec functionality.
It is not meaningful to run the ‘cd’ command
directly via sudo, e.g.,
$ sudo cd /usr/local/protected
since when the command exits the parent process (your
shell) will still be the same. The -D option can be used to run a
command in a specific directory.
Running shell scripts via sudo can expose the same kernel
bugs that make set-user-ID shell scripts unsafe on some operating systems
(if your OS has a /dev/fd/ directory, set-user-ID shell scripts are
generally safe).
If you believe you have found a bug in sudo, you can submit
a bug report at https://bugzilla.sudo.ws/
Limited free support is available via the sudo-users mailing list,
see https://www.sudo.ws/mailman/listinfo/sudo-users to subscribe or search
the archives.
sudo is provided “AS IS” and any express or
implied warranties, including, but not limited to, the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose are disclaimed. See the
LICENSE.md file distributed with sudo or
https://www.sudo.ws/about/license/ for complete details.